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MumcIPAL CoRPORATIONs-PoWER OF THE MuNICIPALITY To ExPEND
PuBLIC FuNDs FOR MuNICIPAL AnVERTISING--A statute allowed any city
to set aside a certain amount annually from the general tax fund, which money
might be expended under the direction and control of the city council for the
purpose of aiding and encouraging the location of industry and other purposes
which would increase the population, taxable property, and business prospects
of the city. The Burlington City Council appropriated $2,000 to the Chamber
of Commerce, a private non-profit corporation, which was organized for the
purpose of advancing the commercial, civic, industrial, and monetary interests
of the city. No specification was,made as to use, and the Chamber of Commerce
used it for general expenses. Plaintiff demanded that the Chamber of Commerce
restore the money and that the City Council bring an action to recover it.
On refusal, plaintiff brought a taxpayer's action1 against the Chamber of
Commerce and a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal,

1 Common law, Walker v. Village of Dillonvale, 82 Ohio St. 137, 92 N.E. 220 (1910),
or statutory, Dowler v. State ex rel. Prunty, 179 Okla. 532, 66 P. (2d) 1081 (1937), taxpayer's actions are allowed in most jurisdictions to recover public funds illegally paid to
municipal officers or third parties; Webster v. Douglas County, 102 Wis. 181, 77 N.W.
885 (1899). The taxpayer must show an injury, McClutchey v. Milwaukee County, 239
Wis. 139, 300 N.W. 224 (1941), and that the municipal authorities refused to act after
a proper demand, Schulz v. Kissling, 228 Wis. 282, 280 N.W. 388 (1938). If demand is
~hown to be futile, it may be excused. Bums v. Essling, 154 Minn. 304, 191 N.W. 899
(1923).
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held, affirmed. Expenditure of the funds was left to the discretion of the
Chamber of Commerce rather than that of the City Council as required by
law and was therefore illegal. Horner v. Chamber of Commerce of the City
of Burlington, Inc., (N. C. 1952) 68 S. E. (2d) 660.
The legality of expenditures of public funds for advertising will depend
on a finding that the municipality is empowered by statute or charter to make
such expenditures and that the advertising is a valid municipal or public
purpose.2 In general, the municipality is limited to powers expressly granted, to
those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and to those indispensable to the
municipal functions. 3 This rule may be more liberally construed in regard to
municipalities with home-rule charters. 4 When there is a reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the power or an ambiguity in the grant, it will usually be
resolved against the municipality.I! Conceding that there is a grant of power
under statute or charter, it is still essential that there be a public purpose. 6
Public purpose is variously defined as a necessary and proper governmental
function, 7 a function which affects the inhabitants as a community and not as
individuals,8 or a function which contributes materially to the health and
welfare of the community.9 Recent decisions would seem to indicate that a
public purpose is one which bears a reasonable relation to the c.orporate function
and which tends to benefit 'the community and citizens by increasing the
facilities, population, business, and indusrry. The municipality and the
legislature will have considerable discretion in the determination of public
purposes and this determination will be accepted by the courts unless there is a
clear abuse of authority.10 It is quite clear that funds may not be appropriated
to the private purposes of individuals, corporations, and associations even where
authorized by statute or charter,11 but the mere fact that the funds go to
and are administrated by private persons or corporations will not rule out the
possibility of a public purpose.12 Advertising of municipal advantages for the
2 Jacksonville
3 New Jersey

v. Oldham, 112 Fla. 502, 150 S. 619 (1933).

Good Humor, Inc. v. Borough of Bradley Beach, 124 N.J.L. 162, 11 A.

(2d) 113 (1940); Moreland v. City of San Antonio, (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) 116 S.W.
(2d) 823. For a most extreme view see City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Bd. of
Commissioners of Jersey City, 134 N.J.L. 180, 46 A. (2d) 425 (1946), where the court
held that the city could advertise to defeat a constitutional amendment although the city's
power to advertise was limited to advertising its advantages.
4 14~6 Woodward Ave. Corp. v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 20 N.W. (2d) 217 (1945).
5 New Jersey Good Humoi;, Inc. v. Borough of Bradley Beach, supra note 3. But compare City Affairs Committee of Jersey City v. Bd. of Commissioners of Jersey City, supra
note 3.
·
·
6 Davis v. City of Taylor, 123 Tex. 39, 67 S.W. (2d) 1033 (1934). But see Roseville v. Tulley, 55 Cal. App. (2d) 601, 131 P. (2d) 395 (1942), where public purpose
was sufficient.
1 Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767 (1923).
s Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 284 P. 134 (1929).
9 City of Tombstone v. Macia, 30 Ariz. 218, 245 P. 677 (1926).
10 Jacksonville v. Oldham, supra note 2; Roseville v. Tulley, supra note 6.
11 Annotated, 112 A.L.R. 571 (1938).
12 City of Fernandina v. State, 143 Fla. 802, 197 S. 45't (1940); Stewart v. Polk
County Supervisors, 30 Iowa 9 (1870); State ex rel. Trustees of La Crosse Public Library
v. Bentley, 163 Wis. 632, 158 N.W. 306 (1916).
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purpose of promoting trade, business, and industry is now accepted as
a valid purpose,13 but this has not always been so. 14 Advertising for other
purposes has frequently been held illegal.15 The facts in the principal case
indicate that the City Council gave the funds to the Chamber of Commerce
without retaining any control over them and that the Chamber of Commerce
devoted the funds to its own general expenses. It is apparent that the City
Council did not comply with the statute which requires that the money be
expended under the direction and control of the Council and that the transaction
has the appearance of an appropriation to private purposes. The usual rule of
strict interpretation of municipal powers -would lead to a conclusion that the
expenditure is illegal, and this would be so even if there is a public purpose.16
While the court did not pass on the question of public purpose, a finding that
an expenditure to advertise the advantages of a community is a public purpose
would be in accord with the weight of authority. Had the City Council supervised and directed the spending of the money for specific advertising projects,
an opposite result might well have been reached even though the funds were
given to a private corporation.17 It is clear that the method in which the funds
are expended may invalidate the appropriation in spite of the fact that it
is for a public purpose and that the specific action is authorized by law.

William A. Bain, Jr.

13 Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, 212 Cal. 607, 299 P. 728 (1931);
Jacksonville v. Oldham, supra note 2; Davis v. City of Taylor, supra note 6.
14 Loeb v. Jacksonville, 101 Fla. 429, 134 S. 205 (1931). But see Jacksonville v.
Oldham, supra note 2, where the Florida court upheld the right of the city to advertise
after a statute authorizing such advertising had been passed by the legislature.
1r; Advertising proposed bond issues, Elsenau v. Chicago, 334 ill. 78, 165 N.E. 129
(1929); campaign to influence selection as state capital, Shannon v. City of Huron, 9 S.D.
356, 69 N.W. 598 (1896); advertising to defeat proposed statute, Port of Seattle v. Superior Court, 93 Wash. 267, 160 P. 755 (1916). But compare City Affairs Committee of
Jersey City v. Bd. of Commissioners of Jersey City, supra note 3.
l6Anderson v. San Antonio, 123 Tex. 163, 67 S.W. (2d) 1036 (1934).
17 Sacramento Chamber of Commerce v. Stephens, supra note 13. See also City of
Fernandina v. State, supra note 12; Stewart v. Polk County Supervisors, supra note 12;
State ex rel. Trustees of La Crosse Public Library v. Bentley, supra note 12.

